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1. INTRODUCTION
Ralph Wedgwood has posed a number of important ques-
tions concerning the discussion of normative authority that
runs through Part III of Facts, Values, and Norms. His ques-
tions all deserve answers, though in reply I must confine my
reply principally to two issues: the means/end principle as a
presupposition of practical inquiry, and the character of nor-
mative force.
2. THE MEANS/END PRINCIPLE
Wedgwood correctly identifies the ‘non-hypothetical’ practical
principle I see as lying behind even so-called ‘hypothetical
imperatives’, namely, a requirement of means/end coherence.
As I see it, the means/end principle is very catholic. It is not
committed to the standard of maximization. Nor is it re-
stricted to causal ways in which means promote ends  it
encompasses as well ways in which an act can realize or ex-
press an end. Accordingly, the means/end principle has no
special affinity with consequentialism or a purely ‘production-
oriented’ (poedic) conception of morality, and is an integral
part of both Aristotelian and Kantian theories of practical
reason.
The means/end principle is a coherence condition of the
form O~[E & ~M], which applies regardless of the content of
one’s ends (i.e., is non-hypothetical) yet does not authorize
detachment of a practical conclusion (i.e., is non-categorical).1
It imposes a discipline on practical agents similar to that
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imposed on theoretical reasoners by the requirement of logi-
cal consistency  if p implies q, then O~[Bel(p) & Bel(~q)].
And just as a reasoner can avoid logical inconsistency either
by accepting both p and q or by rejecting p if he rejects q, an
agent can avoid practical incoherence either by adopting M if
she holds E, or by revising E if she will not to perform M.
Wedgwood and I agree that means/end coherence and logi-
cal consistency are not ‘constitutive’ of the mental states of
having goals or beliefs. No norms would be needed to enforce
conceptual or metaphysical necessities. Lapses in means/end
coherence and logical consistency, in contrast, are a familiar
part of everyday life and play a crucial role in our capacity to
learn. An agent can become disaffected with an end when she
finds herself increasingly unable to stomach the means it re-
quires, and a believer’s confident preconception can be under-
mined from within when experience yields incompatible
perceptions that he cannot successfully explain away.
We can learn through lapses in coherence because we feel a
normative pressure to restore coherence. The capacity to feel
such pressure is part of the general psychological backdrop
that enables individuals to have beliefs with determinate con-
tent and to act with definite purposes  indeed, to be capable
of reasoning and be worth reasoning with. It is thus a key
part of our capacity to exercise meaningful self-regulation
and rational self-guidance. Thus far, I think, Wedgwood and
I agree.
3. GARY’S PRESUPPOSITIONS
Turn now to the independent-minded student, Gary, who
asks, ‘‘Why should I conform to the standards of reason laid
down by the philosophers we’ve studied?’’ Assume that Gary
is the kind of person one can reason with, and raises his
question in earnest. Does he thereby betray deference to any
practical norms? In my original paper, I suggested that Gary
implicitly defers to a Low Brow principle of means/end
coherence. Wedgwood correctly points out that Gary need
not be assuming anything quite so definite, and offers his
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own suggestion of a practical commitment Gary’s challenge
presupposes rather than calls into question.
If Gary is sincere in presenting himself as an agent in
search of reasons, Wedgwood argues, then he must ‘‘presup-
pose the normative authority’’ of the practical should that fig-
ures in his query. That is, he must allow that a correct
answer to his question, if one could be given, would settle for
him the question ‘‘What to do?’’ (‘other things equal,’ of
course  again, we treat this as understood). Let us grant
that the practical should is committal in this way, and attri-
bute to Gary sincere and competent use of it.
Now, imagine that Gary has been convinced to accept a
standard, S, as correct. Following Wedgwood, we can say
that he thereby agrees that it is settled that complying with S
is the thing for him to do. Gary has, effectively, committed
himself to the policy of conforming to S (compare Bratman,
2000). According to this policy, Gary is to act in accord with
S in an open-ended range of circumstances. If, in some cir-
cumstance C, conformity with S would calls for taking means
M, then Gary’s policy tells him to perform M in C  for
him, at least, the question of what to do in C is settled. But
what if Gary balks at this, protesting that the means/end
principle is a further policy, one of which he would still need
convincing even after accepting S? A Tortoise-like regress
threatens. If it were a further policy, P, then Gary could
cheerfully accept P as well, while leaving open the question
whether he is committed to taking those acts required to
bring about compliance with it. Better to say that practical
commitment to a policy is incomplete to the extent that it
does not bring with it commitment to the indispensable
means of compliance. As Thomas Nagel writes: ‘‘Reasons are
transmitted across the relation between ends and means’’
(1970, p. 33). If Gary has a problem with the idea of enacting
the indispensable means M of complying with S, then this is
a problem about making the initial commitment to S, not a
problem brought on by an independent principle.
The contribution of means/end reasoning to making the
practical should genuinely practical explains why a means/end
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principle is at least part of the story of practical reason on
nearly everyone’s account, and why Instrumentalism has
(misleadingly) struck so many as uncontroversial.
4. NORMATIVE FORCE
Freely formed beliefs, goals, policies, and intentions involve
commitment, which is to say, a kind of unfreedom. Suppose
that I am initially agnostic about q. If I happen freely to
examine the question whether p and (p fi q), and make up
my mind that both are true, then unless I go back on those
commitments, I have cast my lot with the world being such
as q  like it or not, either ~q is wrong or I am. This kind of
unfreedom with respect to q is neither physical nor metaphys-
ical  I do not lose my freedom to err. Rather, it is norma-
tive. Situations of this kind display a blending of force and
freedom which I take to be typical of the domain of norma-
tive self-regulation.2 Suppose, then, that I recognize the logi-
cal implication, feel its bearing on whether I can avoid
commitment to q, and decide in light of all my evidence to
overcome any reservations I have about q and accept it ra-
ther than reject p or (p fi q). This looks like a paradigm case
of normative guidance via ‘the force of argument’. Yet, as
Wedgwood notes, I claim in the book that argument alone
cannot afford a complete model for understanding normative
force, even in the domain of theoretical reason and even if (as
Wedgwood suggests) the notion of an argument is enlarged
to include a variety of non-deductive forms of reasoning.
Why, according to me, isn’t argument enough?
Arguments themselves are logical entities, not inferences or
claims about what ought to be inferred from what. We use
arguments as models for our inferences and ought claims be-
cause we believe that arguments encode information about
relations of normative epistemic significance, such as implica-
tion, evidential support, and consistency.3 However, whenever
we deploy an argument on behalf of an ought, we draw upon
sources of authority beyond the argument itself. Absent com-
mitment to the argument’s premises and deference to its
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rules, the argument by itself can exert no authority over our
minds to ‘force’ us to accept the conclusion.4 To be a Bayes-
ian is not to accept Bayes’ Rule merely as a theorem of the
probability calculus, but as a guide to appropriate revision of
one’s credence in response to evidence. The slogan for all this
could be: Commitment out?  Commitment in.
Returning to Wedgwood’s question: perhaps these input
commitments can be seen as themselves the upshot of prior
argument? In the case of epistemic commitments arising from
perceptual experience, Wedgwood urges that the argument
form:
(A) From ‘It appears to me as if q’ infer ‘q’
is epistemically legitimate. Grant this, but now we need the
premise ‘It appears to me as if q’. Call that p. How to arrive
at p by means of an argument? We might try another appli-
cation of (A): it appears to me (introspecting my occurrent
experience) as if p, so p. Yet now an argument is needed for
the introspective report ‘It appears to me as if p’. Is regress
blocked at this point because introspective reports are ‘self-
evidencing’? But ‘self-evidence’ is not a matter of feeling the
force of argument  it is a claim of authority without argu-
ment. Similar problems arise if we attempt to justify the rules
of logic via ‘the force of argument’. We face potential regress
or rule-circularity, or end up helping ourselves to authority
by speaking of ‘self-evidence’ or ‘stipulation’. More generally,
in order to feel the normative force of an argument we must
already credit ourselves with some authority on matters of
self-continuity, memory, and the contents of our own thought
and experience. Were I to lose this basic trust in my own fac-
ulties, from what could I derive it?  Certainly the fact that
something appeared self-evident to me could yield no convic-
tion. Given some measure of underived self-trust, I can ques-
tion my faculties piecemeal by means of failures of
corroboration, or strengthen my initial confidence in them by
means of induction. No particular element of self-trust must
remain wholly fixed or indubitable throughout such question-
ing and learning. In this sense, then, I am happy to accept
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Wedgwood’s claim that ‘‘perhaps all of our beliefs can be de-
fended  at least retrospectively  by means of ... good argu-
ments.’’ Not because we can defend them by arguments ex
nihilo, but because, for familiar holistic reasons, we can seek
corroboration or evidence for, or subject to critique, any ele-
ment of our beliefs in light of the rest. Feeling the force of an
argument is a very real thing  we all know how inconve-
nient and uncomfortable it can sometimes be. I have been
urging that it involves something quite unlike a rule or an
argument, namely, a sentiment  default trust. This is no rea-
son to reject inferential rules like Wedgwood’s (A) or deny
their potential authority. The sense of competition is mis-
placed: one and the same thought-process can be following
rule (A), feeling the force of argument, and being guided by
underived sentiment.5
NOTES
1 Where E is an end and M an indispensable means, O[ ___ ] is the
objective ought, and ‘other things equal’ is understood. Note that this
principle is distinct from Instrumentalism, E fi O[M], and from (what we
might call) Ought Entrainment, O[E] fi O[M].
2 Here is Kant on the subject: ‘‘The consciousness of a free submission
of the will to the law, yet as combined with the unavoidable constraint
put on all inclinations though only by one’s own reason, is respect for the
law.’’ (Kant, 1788, 5:80). Wedgwood challenges my account of Kant on
respect for the law and the normativity of morality, which gives a basic
role to ‘moral feeling’. He argues that ‘‘our susceptibility to moral feeling
follows from our being subject to the moral law’’ owing exclusively to the
fact of our freedom. Therefore, he argues, this susceptibility cannot ex-
plain or ground our being subject to the moral law. Is this at odds with
my claim that, according to Kant, ‘‘we must look for a ‘feeling of a spe-
cial kind’, not obligation, at the bottom of moral duty’’? Here are two of
the passages in Kant I had in mind, one from the Metaphysics of Morals,
the other from the second Critique:
Respect (reverentia) [for the moral law] is, again, something merely sub-
jective, a feeling of a special kind, not a judgment about an object that it
would be a duty to bring about or promote. A duty to have respect
would thus amount to being put under an obligation to duties. ... [I]t
must rather be said that the law within [the agent] unavoidably forces
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from him respect for his own being, and this feeling (which is of a spe-
cial kind) is the basis of certain duties, that is, of certain actions that are
consistent with respect toward himself (Kant, 1785, 6:402).
Therefore respect for the moral law must be regarded ... as a subjective
ground of activity  that is, as the incentive to compliance with the law
 and as the ground for maxims of a course of life in conformity with it
(Kant, 1788, 5:79)
Kant, I claim, requires duty to have a dual grounding: objective (‘‘a
law, which represents an action that is to be done as objectively neces-
sary’’) and subjective (‘‘an incentive, which connects a ground for deter-
mining choice to this action subjectively’’). The first is ‘‘a merely
theoretical cognition of a possible determination of choice,’’ and not a will
or a maxim for action; the second alone is practical, since ‘‘the obligation
so to act is connected in the subject with a ground for determining choice
generally’’ (Kant, 1785, p. 6:218).
3. Compare Wittgenstein’s remark that logic is a ‘normative science’ in
the sense that ‘‘we often compare the use of words with games and calculi
which have fixed rules.’’ (1953, § 81). For further discussion, see Railton
(2001).
4. If we think of the norms of inference as ‘encoded’ in the logical con-
stants figuring in the premises, then the point would be that in order to
be committed to the premises, one must accord authority in the regulation
of thought to these encoded logical operations relations.
5. With thanks to Aaron Bronfman and Jacob Ross for very helpful
conversation.
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